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Leonard v.B. Sutton Award Paper
Military Intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina:
Will World Politics Prevail Over the Rule of
International Law?*
MICHAEL P. RoCH**
"International law is that thing which the evil ignore and the righ-
teous refuse to enforce." - Leon Uris
I. INTRODUCTION
Sarajevo, only three years ago a bustling Central European city, is
today a mixture of rubble, bodies, and bullets. The Serbs have mur-
dered more than several hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims' and
have systematically raped countless Muslim women' in their effort to
maintain the utopia of a "Greater Serbia" to encompass much of
Yugoslavia's territory.3 Nearly one half of Bosnia-Hercegovina's pre-
war population of 4.4 million has become refugees4 to avoid the count-
This article received the United of Denver College of Law's Leonard v.B.
Sutton Award for the best paper in international law in 1995. The award includes a
scholarship to attend one summer at The Hague Academy of International Law. The
author would like to thank Chief Justice Sutton for his generous support.
Events prior to January 15, 1995 form the historical basis of this article.
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1996; Master of Accountancy,
University of Denver School of Accountancy, 1991. Prior to attending law school, the
author was a management consultant in the former Yugoslavia.
1. Fred McCloskey, The U.S. is Appeasing Fascism and Genocide, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, December 31, 1992, at 19.
2. See Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15
WHrITIER L. REv. 319, 352-355 (1994); see also John Webb, Genocide Treaty - Eth-
nic Cleansing - Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Geno-
cide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 377, 380 (1993); Chuck Sudetic, Jet Attacks Bosnian Town; 10 Deaths Re-
ported, N. Y. TIMES, November 10, 1994, at A8.
3. See infra notes 51 and 64 and accompanying text.
4. Roger Cohen, Balkan Moral Order Upset As Victim Becomes Victor, N. Y.
TIMES, November 6, 1994, sec. 4, at 1 [hereinafter Balkan Moral Order]; David Bind-
er, Pariah as Patriot; Ratko Mladic, N. Y. TIMES, September 4, 1994, sec. 6, at 26;
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less violations against human rights.5 Thousands are still to die in the
most inhumane of ways. All this under the watchful eyes of United
Nations (U.N.) observatory troops who are powerless to intervene.
Although the international community promised during the
conflict's early stages to quickly end this war, little has been accom-
plished to make good on that promise. This crisis stretches the limits
of the United Nations and of peace negotiations on a daily basis. Yet
the political will of key nations to put a quick end to the war using the
only medium that will accomplish peace, United Nations military in-
tervention, is missing.
This article analyzes the possibilities of and strongly advocates
military intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the United Nations
charter. It provides first a historical introduction to the ex-Yugoslav
region, focusing on Bosnia-Hercegovina and on Serbia, and to the
events of the conflict through the end of 1994.6 Second, it provides a
brief introduction to the intervention concept.7 Third, it applies the
possibilities of legal military intervention under the United Nations
Charter to the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. s The last section evaluates
the peace making efforts to date and makes final observations.9
Larry Pressler, Justice Must Be Demanded for 'Ethnic Cleansing' Crimes, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1992, at 19; Anna-Patricia Kahn, Wo sind die bosnischen
Kinder? (Where are the Bosnian children?), Focus, May 16, 1994, at 108.
5. See generally Human Rights Watch, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA: A HELSINKI
WATCH REPORT, (1993). In two volumes, this work represents a compilation of such
violations across all areas and enclaves in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Alleged offenses in-
clude rape, mutilation, summary executions, and castration. The atrocities are de-
scribed in varying levels of detail.
For example, in one, now well-publicized 1992 account, an officer in charge of
the Omarksa facility named Dusko Tadic ordered one young boy held prisoner to
bite off the penis of another inmate. Id. at 187. After Tadic's capture in Germany
early 1994, a former inmate at the same camp reported that "[e]very day, after
Dusko Tadic was finished in the interrogation room, we had to wash blood from the
floor . . . In a garage he himself cut off men's genitals. He was a butcher." Stephen
Kinzer, Germans Arrest Serb as Balkan War Criminal, N. Y. TIMES, February 14,
1994, at A6. The same inmate reported that Tadic laughed as he watched his vic-
tims bleed. Id.
Another, undocumented report includes the case of a refugee who reported to
her treating doctor in Germany that Serbs raped her nine-year-old niece in the
woman's house in Bosnia; after they had satisfied themselves, the same perpetrators
allegedly gouged out her husband's eyes before quartering him and burning him in
the fireplace. Interview with Dr. med. Peter Blosch, Ottobeuren, Germany (April
1993).
6. See infra part II.
7. See infra part III.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part V.
VOL. 24:2,3
1996 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BOSNiA-HERCEGOVINA
II. YUGOSLAV HISTORY: WAR AND OPPRESSION FOLLOWED BY LIBERAL
SOCIALIST RULE
Many of the factors which caused this war are imbedded in the
Yugoslavs' complex history. Since a thorough discussion of that history
is not possible here, the following pages are limited to the relevant
historical events which led up to the situation as it existed at the be-
ginning of 1994 and are confined to the Bosnia-Hercegovinan and Serb
regions.
Before the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia"0 (Yugoslavia), which immediately preceded and partially
caused the Bosnian war, Slovenians, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins,
Bosnians, Macedonians, and Albanians lived peacefully in Yugoslavia;
each enjoyed its own culture and history until the signing of the Decla-
ration of Corfu in 1917 which formed the foundation for the Yugoslav
state. As a whole, all Yugoslav nations combined to approximately 24
million people in an area of 256,000 km2."
A. Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia: From the beginnings to World
War II
From its beginnings, all of Yugoslavia suffered from constant
foreign rule, most commonly exercised by the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire and the Ottoman Empire. 2 As is common among colonizing pow-
ers, each ruler attempted to impose his own culture on his new acqui-
sition. Ethnic strife and revolt were common, resulting in migration
and in the development of a strong need for independence by even the
smallest of identifiable groups.
1. Bosnia-Hercegovina
The region of Bosnia-Hercegovina was settled by Croats and Serbs
by the seventh century. Signs of Bosnian autonomy were evidenced by
the rising of Bogolinism, a Catholic-Orthodox sect, around the twelfth
century; by the fourteenth century, Bosnia had become an important
state. Bosnian adversaries within the state founded a rival state,
namely Hercegovina, in the late fourteenth century. Both Bosnia and
Hercegovina were conquered by the Turks around 1483; the Turks
10. "Yugoslav" literally translated means "South-Slav," a seemingly appropriate
name for the ethnicity of the peoples comprising this state. Bruce McFarlane, YUGO-
SLAVIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICs AND SOCIETY 4 (1988).
11. YUGOSLAVIA A COUNTRY STUDY 301 (Glenn E. Curtis, ed., 1990) [hereinafter
COUNTRY STUDY]. For a comparison, consider the size of the U.S. state of Wyoming
of about 253,390 km2 with a population of about 500,000.
12. James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in Internal Conflicts, in EN-
FORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 30 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1993).
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added Islam to the already historically divided region of the Eastern
and Western Roman Empires of Diocletian and Theodosius which
formed the dividing line between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. 3 The
Bogolian nobility converted to Islam in order to retain family land; the
lower classes became serfs to the Bogolians and Ottomans. In the next
four hundred years, Bosnia-Hercegovina became virtual chattel in the
territorial games of Austrian, Russian, and Turkish nobility. In 1850,
Turkey centralized the rule of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Sarajevo to settle
ongoing unrest. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina shortly
after the 1878 signing of the Treaty of Berlin. In an attempt to in-
crease the Catholic population, Austria-Hungary colonized the region
with Catholic Slavs and Germans; these families again essentially
reduced both Bosnia-Hercegovinans and Serbs to serfs."
By 1878, the Hungarian crown ruled over much of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, a rule that was very much resented by all of its three
main ethnic groups. The Muslims wanted to remain with the Turks,
the Croats feared "Hungarianization" of their culture, and the Serbs,
still condemned to serfdom, screamed for recognition and alliance with
Serbia in the south.
15
2. Serbia
The Serbs lived under Byzantine dominion until the middle of the
twelfth century, after which time Serbia enjoyed a fair amount of au-
tonomy under the Byzantines. The Turks conquered the Serbs in 1459
and ruled Serbia until Austria took dominion of Serbian regions south
of the Sava river in 1718. In the remaining areas, Turkish rule re-
mained until the Serbs, in alliance with Russia, Romania, and Bulgar-
ia, ousted the Turks in 1877. Austria-Hungary annexed Serbia only
three years later, defeating the Serbian dream of an independent state.
By that time, Serbs lived as minorities in many parts of Yugoslavia, a
fact which remains true today. 8
3. Formation of the Yugoslav state
During World War I, the area of Yugoslavia again became the
playing-ground of the major European powers. In the secret 1915 Trea-
ty of London, the Entente (consisting of France, Britain, and Russia)
promised Istria, much of Dalmatia, and Slovenia to Italy. The time had
come for an independent Yugoslav state, a thought which had been
considered at times after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, but one which
could not be realized due to constant foreign occupation. Finally, the
13. Vojislav Stanovcic, History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts Yugoslavia, in
YuGOSLAvIA: A FRACTURED FEDERALISM 24 (Dennison Rusinow, ed., 1988).
14. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 22-24.
15. Id. at 25.
16. Id. at 16-22.
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Declaration of Corfu, uniting Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, was signed
in July, 1917, in an attempt to neutralize the effects of the Treaty of
London. By the end of World War I, the international community rec-
ognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (SKS). 7
The Declaration of Corfu promised equal recognition of the Cyril-
lic and Latin alphabets"8 and recognition of all three nationalities,
including democratic representation. Notwithstanding these provisions,
Croats and Serbs soon clashed about the issue whether governmental
rule should take federal or centralized forms; Serbia argued strongly
for the latter.' The conflict between Croatia and Serbia was fueled by
the Usta~e, a Croat nationalist group.' Ethnic hatred and civil strife,
also due" to the number of non-slavic minorities which the SKS inherit-
ed, divided the young nation. Lack of experienced leadership led to the
violent suppression of Albanian and Macedonian minorities after nu-
merous uprisings. The Serbs' self-declared king unsuccessfully tried to
impose unity upon ethnic groups, but by 1931 allowed limited democ-
racy to calm the spirits.2
World War II ensued, and after several small attempts to ally,
leaders of the SKS' quasi-democratic cabinet and SKS' economy be-
came more and more closely knit with Germany. The fascist salute and
green shirts became the policy of one cabinet member's group. The an-
nexation of Austria strengthened Germany's grip on the SKS. In des-
perate search for an ally, the SKS finally recognized the Soviet Union
in 1940, a move which proved to be too little, too late. On March 25,
1941, the SKS was forced into signing the Tripartite Pact with Germa-
ny which assured non-aggression from the Axis powers; on April 6,
1941, the first bomb fell on Belgrade, and eleven days later the SKS
surrendered to German rule.2"
Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria dismembered the Yugo-
slav kingdom during the War, and all imposed cultural terror. Germa-
ny created a puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia, which
roughly encompassed Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Having refused
to fuel the Axis war machine, two million Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies
were eliminated by means of religious conversion, deportation, and
17. Id. at 27.
18. Serb uses the Cyrillic alphabet. Croatian and Slovenian, although Slavic lan-
guages, use the Latin alphabet, a phenomenon due to Western occupants and the
Catholic religion which became predominant in both Croatia and Slovenia; Serbs are
largely Orthodox. The Latin alphabet was imposed on Bosnia-Hercegovina prior to
the conversion to Islam.
19. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 29.
20. Steinberg, supra note 12, at 31.
21. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 34.
22. I& at 36-37.
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violence. Albanians and Hungarians, two abused minorities under the
SKS, also took turns massacring Jews and Serbs.'
From the Yugoslav resistance movement arose the Socialist ideal-
ist Jozip Broz Tito. Tito arranged in 1944 for the Soviet Union to enter
Yugoslav territory. This move meant the end of the War, and the coun-
cil supporting Tito's resistance endeavors formed the post-World War
II basis for Yugoslavia's government. World War II left 1.7 million
people or eleven per cent of the pre-war population dead, second in
death rate only to Poland.' Tito and his cabinet instituted
communist rule, and, after mock elections, dissolved the SKS and es-
tablished the "Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia" on Novem-
ber 29, 1945; that name was changed in 1963 to "Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia."' The new government adopted a Soviet-style
constitution which established a strong central government under the
Serbian Belgrade and divided regions of the nation, more or less along
ethnic lines, into states."
B. From World War II to 1990: Events leading to war
1. Ethnicity and self-government
Yugoslavia's diversity problems were three-fold; Catholicism and
Orthodoxy divided the country into East and West, and the disparity of
economic growth and level of development split the country into North
and South. Join non-Slav minority nations in majority enclaves
(such as Albanians and Hungarians) with Slavic tribal minorities, each
with their own history of ethnic hatred, foreign rule, and injustice, and
diversity becomes a three-dimensional phenomenon which is very diffi-
cult to manage. Even the United States of America arguably faces
diversity today on only one level, namely ancestral national origin.
In order to overcome the distrust among the various ethnic groups
after World War II, Tito placed much propaganda effort in unity and
equality of the new state.' While this effort was necessary and
helped to promote the self-management concept, bureaucracy on all
governmental levels later hindered the inherent autonomy in such a
concept."
Tito's government also attempted some reforms in the early 1960s.
These reforms were designed to please the Croats who were quite up-
23. Id. at 36-37.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Mark Thompson, A PAPER HOUSE: THE ENDING OF YUGOSLAvIA 1 (1992).
26. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 43.
27. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 25.
28. Id.
29. 1d at 36.
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set about earlier unity policies; these policies, for instance, outlawed
Croatian as a language and adopted "Serbo-Croatian" as the official
language of Croatia and Serbia. Severe bureaucratic "adjustments"
attempted to shift economic planning from Belgrade to the individual
states in response to economic difficulties," allowing limited self-gov-
ernment in the regions,3 ' in an effort to diffuse debates of national
self-rule versus federalism, debates which remained from the SKS 2
and which would continue until the disintegration of the Yugoslav
state in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
More important than resulting in a stimulated economy, the "Re-
form Crisis" allowed significant political change which continually
forced Tito to give in to Croatia's demand for essentially a confederacy,
which was a political structure for which Croatia had always pressed,
especially since the end of World War II. By the early 1970s at the
latest, Croatia's nationalism had spread to the other republics as
well.33 The Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Albanians in
Kosovo especially followed the Croatian model of demanding self-rule.
Ethnic divisions aside, the federal government largely neglected
its citizens, especially with respect to individual rights.3 4 For in-
stance, Serbs frequently arrested liberals and state nationalists by
1971 as tensions began to worsen. A new and complex constitution was
written and passed in 1974 aimed at controlling the increasingly diffi-
cult situation; the new constitution provided for a complex system of
checks and balances for all types of groups present in Yugoslavia,35 a
possible beginning of the end.
2. Economics and Tito's death
The end of the state came one step closer after Tito's death in
1980, an event which again threatened political disharmony.36 Vari-
ous groups at that point in time often proposed drastic political re-
forms, many of which were anti-Serb.3 7 A true leadership crisis devel-
oped in 1988, when Slovenia and Croatia boldly began to push for a
market-economy in an attempt to solve the economic crisis and to re-
pay $21 billion in hard-currency debt.' By then, debates about the
distribution of the national budget, allocation of transportation re-
30. Pedro Ramet, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963-1983, at
87 (1984) [hereinafter NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM].
31. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 43.
32. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 122-125.
34. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 36.
35. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 54.
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 2.
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sources, et cetera, were flaming. 9 The true reason behind this push,
however, was simple: Slovenia was the most productive of the re-
gions," its eight per cent population producing up to twenty per cent
of the nation's GNP, with Croatia not too far behind."' In this time of
economic disparity, Slovenia and Croatia both longed back to the be-
ginning 1970s, years that showed relatively high economic growth, an
improving living standard, increasing ties to the west, and general
commercial optimism."
3. Foreign policy
In matters of foreign policy, the alliance with the Soviet Union
had severe ups and downs, especially later in light of the Soviet
Union's invasions into Hungary in 1956 and into Czechoslovakia in
1968. It appeared that Yugoslavia soon went its own way, always cau-
tiously eyeing its dominant ally, eventually allowing unrestricted trav-
el and free flow of intellectual materials.
The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s allowed the Yugo-
slavian states to make decisions with less fear of reprisal from Mos-
cow. The Yugoslav states saw the Soviet Union's disbandonment as
their opportunity for independence.
C. The beginnings of war
Disintegration began with the December 23, 1990, vote of
Slovenians for independence;' Slovenia's discontent with the federal
state was largely due to the fact that the "federation virtually ceased
to function as a unified state."" After a brief period of war and nego-
tiations aided by the European Union" and the Conference of Securi-
ty of Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),5 Slovenia achieved peace
around July 5, 1991."
39. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 195-202.
40. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 206.
41. See NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM, supra note 30, at 197.
42. Stanovcic, supra note 13, at 2.
43. Croatia followed suit May 19, 1991.
44. Lenard J. Cohen, Regime Transition in a Disintegrating Yugoslavia: The
Law-of-Rule vs. The Rule-of-Law, THE CARL BECK PAPERS IN RUSSIAN AND EAST
EUROPEAN STUDIES, No. 908, at 31 (1992).
45. The European Community changed its name to the European Union on Jan-
uary 1, 1993. The term European Union is used throughout this article for consis-
tency purposes.
46. The CSCE has no enforcement powers and it bases its philosophy of resolv-
ing disputes largely on consensus-building. See Miriam Sapiro, Dispute Resolution:
General Methods and CSCE Mechanisms, ASIL NEWSLETTER, September 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Lawrev library, Allrev file.
47. Marc Weller, Current Development: The International Response to the Disso-
lution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AJ.I.L. 569, 573 (1992).
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The root of this and the Croatian conflict was largely grounded in
the fact that the Serb leadership did not desire a loose federation and
in the failure of negotiations to that effect." Serb actions were doubt-
lessly encouraged by initial responses of the European Union and of
the CSCE and subsequent responses of the United States, all of which
favored territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at that early time in the
conflict.49
However, despite European Union observers, fighting broke out
again, this time in Serbian majority enclaves in Croatia between eth-
nic Serbs and Croats. The Croatian Serbs were supported increasingly
by Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces;' these actions were justi-
fied by the Yugoslav federal government to protect the Serbs in an
independent Croatian state."' The United Nations Security Council
remained silent, and even during its first meeting on September 25,
1991, it did nothing but express "deep concern" over the death and
destruction and called for a military arms embargo against Yugoslavia
as a whole.52 Cyrus R. Vance was appointed shortly thereafter as the
Secretary-General's personal envoy to Yugoslavia."
Bosnia-Hercegovina followed Slovenia and Croatia on October 15,
1991, in its declaration for independence; this vote was supported by
virtually all Muslims but was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.5" On
February 24, 1992, a make-shift Bosnia-Hercegovinan government
asked the JNA to leave Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory.' Around
March 9, 1992, initial United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
troops entered Yugoslavia; 6 by that time, however, a massive amount
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id. at 570. Whenever parts of nations desire to secede, it appears that the
West favors territorial integrity and tolerance of minorities instead of secession by
the minority. See Barbara Crossette, What is a Nation?, N. Y. TIMES, December 26,
1994, sec. 1, at 10.
50. See, e.g., Binder, supra note 4 (discussing the Yugoslav army's transfer of
experienced officers to lead Bosnian Serb forces). See also Barbara Crossette, U.N.
Eases Curbs on Yugoslavia After Serbian Peace Concessions,.N. Y. TIMES, September
24, 1994, at 1. (reporting Yugoslavia shipping military items across the Drina River
into Bosnian Serb territory).
51. Id. See also Weller, supra note 47 at 574. Recent evidence suggests that the
Serbs prepared for war against Croatia as early as 1986. Philip J. Cohen, Ending
the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE INTL L. REV. 19, 27
(1994) [hereinafter Ending the War].
52. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23067 (1991).
53. Amy Lou King, Bosnia-Hercegovina - Vance.Owen Agenda for a Peaceful
Settlement: Did the U.N. Do too Little, too Late, to Support this Endeavor? 23 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 352 (1993).
54. Webb, supra note 2, at 377-378.
55. Weller, supra note 47, at 597.
56. Id. at 585.
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of military armor already had been transferred from federal Serb
troops to the local Serb fighters.57
After Bosnia fulfilled certain conditions to protect minority groups
by placing the respective clauses in its provisory constitution," the
European Union finally recognized Bosnia-Hercegovinan independence
on April 6, 1992,"9 despite Bosnian Serb opposition and fierce fight-
ing.'M Despite the fact that one month earlier 40 of 102 United Na-
tions Military Observers were placed in Bosnia-Hercegovina (the re-
mainder was stationed throughout Yugoslavia),"' war between
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims broke out April 7, 1992, as
Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, declared independence
from the new state6 2 with full support from Slobodan Milosevic, Presi-
dent of the Yugoslav Serbs, 3 the ultimate objective being joinder of
the Bosnian and Yugoslav Serbs."
The Serbian Yugoslav government, together with Montenegro,
formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, essentially becoming the de
facto successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on April
27, 1992."5 This new state "was no longer open to the former central
authorities, now totally dominated by Serbia, to claim a right to exer-
cise authority within non-Serbian parts of the former [Yugoslavia]."'
Fighting soon became intense and wide-spread; Bosnian Serb
militia were supported, both directly through manpower and indirectly
through weaponry, by JNA forces."' Alija Izetbegovic, president of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, soon appealed to the European Union, CSCE, and
United Nations" to stop the slaughter committed by the much stron-
ger Serb forces. Inaction by those three bodies marks the stalemate
which is still in effect today: the international bodies would try to
negotiate peace with Serbian forces and would order Serb withdrawal
from the region; the Yugoslav Serbs would insist that they were not
interfering with the hostilities; the Bosnian and Yugoslav Serbs would
57. See id. at 586.
58. A Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia
and Hercegovina to that effect was passed March 18, 1992. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 593; Webb, supra note 2, at 378.
60. Weller, supra note 47, at 597.
61. Id. at 586.
62. Id. at 593; Webb, supra note 2, at 386.
63. Judy Dempsey, Bosnians Seek U.N. Force to Stop Spread of War, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1991, at 2.
64. Danilo Ttark, Remarks Concerning the Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRORS. 50, 52 (1993); Ending the War, supra note 51, at
32; Steinberg, supra note 12, at 47.
65. See Dept. of State Dispatch, Chronology: Developments Related to the Crisis
in Bosnia, March 10-August 28, 1992.
66. Weller, supra note 47, at 596.
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id.
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insist that, although Bosnia-Hercegovina is a recognized nation, the
conflict was internal"' and would maintain that intervention in inter-
nal affairs of a state is illegal under the United Nations charter." In
the meantime, reports of systematic efforts by the Bosnian Serbs to
"ethnically cleanse" Bosnia had been confirmed;7' at latest by Septem-
ber, 1991, the European Union, CSCE, and the United Nations had
full knowledge of the various atrocities ongoing in Bosnia-
Hercegovina."
The United Nations Secretary-General informed the Security
Council on April 29, 1992, that a feasibility study of deploying United
Nations peacekeeping forces would be conducted." The Security
Council rejected Bosnia-Hercegovina's request for 15,000 peace en-
forcement troops and instead demanded the usual cease-fire, and, for
the first time, demanded free passage of humanitarian aid efforts un-
der Chapter VI. 7"
Later, the United Nations Security Council adopted sanctions."
These, however, came much too late, and proved ineffective due to
many logistics problems in border enforcement76 and willful disregard
for the embargo.77
The first reports of regional organizations' involvement other than
the European Union and CSCE appeared August 7, 1992, when the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) first began pressuring
the United Nations for action." However, extended OIC actions could
fuel Serbian propaganda that long claimed that the Bosnian Muslims
desired to turn Bosnia-Hercegovina into an Islamic fundamentalist
69. See id. at 597-603.
70. See infra note 105 and the accompanying text.
71. The Serb leadership would later point to the cruelty committed against the
Serbs in Yugoslavia's early history by the Muslim and Croatian forces. Unter den
russischen Fliugel gedrdngt (Forced under the Russian wing), DER SPIEGEL, March 3,
1994, at 144-145 (in an interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic).
72. See King, supra note 53, at 351.
73. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Res-
olution 749 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/23900 (1992).
74. Weller, supra note 47, at 602; see also infra notes 120 and 130 for the perti-
nent sections of Chapter VII.
75. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/res/757 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1453 (1992).
76. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Edward M.
Kennedy, U.S. Senate, Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions
6 (April 1993) [hereinafter GAO Report to Senator Kennedy].
77. Ending the War, supra note 51, at 31. Greece is accused of deliberately vio-
lating the embargo as part of an arrangement with Yugoslavia to divide Macedonian
territory and return part of it to Greece. Greece has long placed claims on Macedo-
nia and refers to it as "the stolen jewels of Greece." ld.
78. Judy Dempsey, Islamic Nations Press U.N. on Force, FIN. TIMES, August 7,
1992, at 2.
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state;" to date, none of OIC's actions have materialized. Throughout
the remainder of 1992, indecision by the United Nations, the United
States, and the European Union was blatantly apparent,8w interrupt-
ed by a well-meant, but initially irrelevant, United Nations Security
Council resolution dated August 13, 1992, that authorized use of force
as a last measure to ensure relief convoys reach their destinations."1
By the end of 1992 and throughout 1994, the frustration of the United
Nations personnel stationed in Bosnia-Hercegovina as to their inability
to accomplish even the smallest of missions due to lack of authoriza-
tion by the United Nations was blatantly obvious.82
In the meanwhile, the Yugoslav Serbs engaged in a terror cam-
paign of political intolerance within their own territory, one of the
worst seen in Europe after German national-socialism, in order to
silence the intellectual and urban minority against the war in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.' Shortly thereafter, in the beginning of March, Vance
and Lord Owen brought their first plan carving up Bosnia-Hercegovina
into small enclaves.' It would soon become clear that the Bosnian
Muslims would not agree to any such plan unless much of their territo-
ry was restored and they were given sea access through either Croatia
or Serbia. Bosnia's position in this respect has not significantly
changed through 1994.
The remainder of 1993 and all of 1994 continued to witness inac-
tion and ineffective action,85 until the United Nations called on NATO
in early 1994 to commence air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions
with the sole purpose of enforcing the earlier resolution ordering the
Serbs to allow relief convoys to pass through to Muslim enclaves and
refugee gathering points.8 This operation took place as all European
79. Id.
80. Roger Matthews and Nancy Dunne, U.N. May Back Force in Bosnia: Western
Governments Strive to Resolve Differences of Scale of Military Involvement, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1993, at 1.
81. Michael Littlejohn et al., U.N. Agrees Force as Last Resort in Bosnia Aid Ef-
fort, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1992, at 1.
82. See David White, U.N. Fears It Can Only 'Ease the Passage of History': How
Restricted Resources and Powers May Prevent U.N. Troops from Fulfilling their al-
ready Limited Tasks. FIN. TIMES, December 5, 1992, at 2. See also Frances Williams,
et al., U.N. Tells Bosnian Factions to Allow Full Scale Relief, FIN. TIMES, February
18, 1993, at 22. Examples include convoys being turned back by Bosnian Serbs,
either through military force or by ordering women and children to crowd access
roads to needy Muslim enclaves. Id.
83. Dusko Doder, Yugoslavia: Nazi-style - Campaign of Terror, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), February 15, 1993 (Reuter Textline).
84. David Gardner, Serbs to Face U.N. Pressure on Peace Plan, FIN. TIMES,
March 9, 1993, at 2.
85. See, e.g., Chuck Sudetic, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview, N. Y. TIMES,
April 18, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Conflict in the Balkans).
86. See, e.g., Unter den russischen Flugel gedrdngt, supra note 71. Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic decried the attack as "clearly anti-Serb," possibly preventing peace
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nations, including Russia, held their breath in fear of an escalation of
a "full-scale war in Europe." 7 Indeed, the fear of war is so great that
some Europeans believe that Bosnia-Hercegovina should all but capitu-
late.
In addition, prosecution of war crimes and the possibility of grant-
ing amnesty to war criminals have become bargaining chips during
peace negotiations as an incentive for the various factions to continue
to participate in those talks.8 9 Indeed, the Bosnia-Hercegovinan crisis
may become one of the most outrageous examples of plea-bargaining in
the history of transnational law.' The price for such bargaining will
be permanent insecurity in the Balkans.9
At the end of 1994, the Serbs held approximately seventy percent
of Bosnian territory.9 2 Casualties have been high, snipers continue to
kill civilians, among them many women and children," and camp
leaders continue to torture their inmates, 4 all under the watchful
eyes of United Nations peacekeepers and the United Nations itself,95
based on diplomacy. Id.
87. Elaine Sciolino, Contain Your Joy: Russia's Back on World Stage, N. Y.
TIMES, February 20, 1994, at A20 (citing a letter of Russia's President Boris
Yeltsin's to U.S. President Clinton),
88. Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. "We disapprove of the offensives now
under way by the Sarajevo government and Bosnian troops even though the respon-
sibility for the war lies with the Serbs." Id. (quoting Alain Juppe, France's Foreign
Minister).
89. Sadruddin Aga Khan, War Crimes Without Punishment, N. Y. Times, at A23.
90. See Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. As one commentator has written:
"The current practice of forcing the victims of Serbian aggression to negotiate with
their tormentors, while keeping the victims weak through an arms embargo, is mor-
ally reprehensible and politically unwise, and serves only to reward Serbia's aggres-
sion by legitimizing ill-gotten war gains." Ending the War, supra note 51, at 24
(1994).
91. This is because "[p]eace without justice cannot endure." Benjamin B. Ferencz
(a prosecutor at the Nilrnberg trials), Editorial, N. Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, sec. 4,
at 16. However, it may be idealistic to expect many war criminals to be tried, given
the history of other, smaller conflicts since World War II and the subsequent
Nalrnberg trials. See Marc D. Charney, Conversations / Telford Taylor; The Laws of
War Are Many, but Self.Interest Is the Only Enforcer, N. Y. TIMES, December 25,
1994, sec. 4, at 7. Since World War II, the responsible nation itself, not some in-
ternational body, has tried individual offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 22
C.M.A. 534 (1973).
92. Roger Cohen, Washington Might Recognize a Bosnian Serb State, N. Y.
TIMES, at 10.
93. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
94. There have been recent discussions as to why camp leaders deem it neces-
sary to engage in torture and rape, or, more broadly, why those in a superior posi-
tion to others feel the need to abuse those inferior. For an excellent psychological
and sociological discussion of this human phenomenon, see Wo lernt man das denn?
(Where does one learn something like this?), DER SPIEGEL, January 17, 1994, at 70-
91.
95. See, e.g., 'Akashi paktiert mit den Serben" ("Akashi cooperates with the
Serbs"), FOCUS, May 21, 1994, at 218.
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helpless to stop the continuing breaches of local, periodically arranged
cease-fires." Little has been resolved as several additional peace pro-
posals have been rejected either because Bosnia stood to lose too much
or because Serbia had to give up too much conquered territory. 7
So much for the drab history of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina
through the end of 1994. The remainder of this article discusses the
legal alternatives of military intervention in order to achieve peace as
soon as possible under these burdening circumstances.
III. HISTORY, POLICY, AND CONDITIONS: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
Since the writings of St. Augustine, people have distinguished
"just wars," i.e. permissible wars, from unjust or impermissible ones;
however, due to its inherent subjectivity, this line of distinction soon
showed to be unworkable.98 Between St. Augustine and World War I,
war was considered a mere fact of life; collective military intervention
into smaller states was primarily a tool employed by the larger em-
pires to keep the established power distributed among the larger
states. 9 For instance, the Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prus-
sia used collective intervention to maintain absolute monarchy as sta-
tus quo within a great part of Europe,0 0 thereby reserving "the right
to use force unilaterally to protect and vindicate legal
entitlements."'0 '
After World War I, the League of Nations required that states
settle their disputes without war. Intervention was only permitted as a
last measure after the League's efforts to remedy a given situation
proved ineffective." 2 This vague set of standards, coupled with the
lack of enforcement power of the League of Nations,0 3 among other
factors, allowed Germany to create world war in order to achieve na-
tional objectives.0 "
96. Among numerous reports of Serb factions breaking the countless cease fire
agreements, see, e.g., Allied in Failure, TIME, December 12, 1994, at 28-32; Paul
Quinn-Judge, Serbs Tighten Grip in Spasm of Violence, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17
1993, at 2.
97. See Conflict in the Balkans, supra note 85, at Al; Bruce W. Nelan, Return to
Sender, TIME, August 1, 1994, at 38. For a discussion on the dissection of Bosnia-
Hercegovina, see, e.g., Christian J. Garris, Bosnia and the Limitations of Internation-
al Law, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 1052-1055 (1994).
98. John Norton Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 191, 192 (1983).
99. Drs. F. X. DeLima, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 17 (1971).
100. Id.
101. W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International
Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279 (1985).
102. DeLima, supra note 99, at 30-32.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Moore, supra note 98, at 193.
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In order to assure that the Second World War remained the last
such war, the charter of the United Nations (the Charter) was adopted
as the first instrument to prohibit all uses of unilateral force," 5
"thereby surpassing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact's prohibition of go-
ing to war as a political means."' °' However, the writers of the Char-
ter clearly intended to prohibit war across international boundaries,
not "insurgency, terrorism, mixed civil-international conflict, conflicts
within nations divided by a cold war, wars of unification, wars of suc-
cession, wars to create states where none previously existed, and com-
petitions among various groups indigenous to the sovereign.""'
Defining the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina as one of international
dimensions by no means makes passing resolutions in favor of the
forcible creation of peace simple. For instance, due to the desire to
maintain status quo, supporting a government in power has tradition-
ally been considered legal and supporting anti-government factions has
been considered illegal. '08 However, since such policy would in es-
sence render moot the competing principle of self-determination of
peoples, scholars developed the standard of neutral non-intervention.
Under this rule, neither faction is to be aided in an internal con-
flict; ° this rule became written in the Charter as well, ° and this
provision may now be seen as the primary cause of frustration of peace
efforts in ex-Yugoslavia. It is this frustration, especially in light of the
gross violations of human rights in ex-Yugoslavia, that some of these
standards may need to be re-worked.'1 The current rules are abso-
105. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, which reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Id.
For an excellent interpretation of Article 2(4), see Oscar Schachter, International
Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (1984).
106. Jost Delbrtkck, A More Effective International Law or a New 'World Law"? -
Some Aspects of the Development of International Law in a Changing International
System, 68 IND. L.J. 705, 707-708 (1993) [hereinafter Development of International
Law]; see generally, General Treaty for Renunciation of War as a Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796, 94 I.N.T.S. 57.
107. Moore, supra note 98, at 194. For a discussion of the role of the United
Nations in civil wars, see Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict,
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 403 (John Morton Moore, ed., 1974).
108. Moore, supra note 98, at 195.
109. Id.
110. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7, which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII. Id.
111. See generally, Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid to
Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of Belligerency, 63
WAsH. L. REV. 43 (1988).
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lutely inadequate to deal with conflicts of the type at hand here, espe-
cially because leaders in Yugoslavia, as did leaders in Iraq during the
1990 conflict,1 2 for instance, believe they may safely disregard inter-
national law, thereby destroying the ultimate goal of the Charter.
These considerations aside, it appears that the Bosnia-
Hercegovinan war is the type of international conflict which the draft-
ers of the Charter intended to confront and prevent. First, Bosnia-
Hercegovina is a nation recognized by the United Nations."' As such,
its borders must be protected from invading forces. Second, the new
Yugoslavia, a nation itself, is aiding the Bosnian Serbs by providing
personnel, arms, and other materials in operations which cross the
Yugoslav-Bosnian border;" this aid amounts to an invading force
and must be prevented.
Even if one rejects these arguments and defines the Bosnian crisis
as an internal one,"' this conflict still has severe international di-
mensions which justify United Nations action. This is because this war
is fueled by racial hatred, and because civilians suffer tremendously in
large numbers through human rights abuses committed on behalf of at
least one faction. In addition, the types of aid provided by the Yugoslav
Serbs will again become an issue. "6
112. Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN L.
REV. 425, 428 (1993).
113. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Recognition appears to be the
most significant in determining the fine line between civil conflict and international
war. See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of Interna-
tional Law, 88 A.J.I.L. 78, 81 (1994).
114. See supra note 67 and infra notes 131 through 133 and accompanying text.
115. Such position is, indeed, sustainable. Consider, for instance, the fact that
small, extremist Bosnian Muslim factions, opposed to Izetbegovic's form of govern-
ment, are fighting next to Bosnian Serb soldiers. See, e.g. Renate Flottau, "Dies hier
ist kein Rambo-Film' (-Mhis is not a Rambo movie"), DER SPIEGEL, July 4, 1994, at
118; Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia,
and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 at note 294; Chuck Sudetic, U.N.'s Forces Put
on Alert As Serbs Advance in Bosnia, N. Y. TIMES, November 21, 1994, at A6.
116. One author used similar standards in his analysis as to when a civil conflict
becomes an international concern. Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Con-
flicts, supra note 107, at 410-415. See also Louis B. Sohn, Civil Wars for States and
the United Nations, in LAw AND CML WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 583 (John
Norton Moore, ed., 1974). Sohn's proposed guidelines for non-intervention in civil
wars are as follows:
The following acts in support of a foreign government or an insurgent group shall be
considered as military intervention for the purpose of these guidelines:
a.Arms sales or grants;
b.Making available military training at home or abroad;
c.Making available military advisers . . . ;
g.Participation in military operations by combat units, whether composed of "volun-
teers" or regular military personnel. Id.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text in support of Serbian forces providing
such assistance.
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For the purposes of the following discussion, it is assumed that
the war in Bosnia is, indeed, one of the types of international conflicts
addressed by the Charter.
IV. INTERVENTION IN THE YUGOSLAV WAR UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER
If peace is indeed the ultimate value to be achieved under the
Charter, "7 under what circumstances, then, is intervention allowed
to attain peace? As discussed, the Charter prohibits any use of
force," 8 with the possible exceptions of armed force as an enforce-
ment measure as authorized by the Security Council, collective and
unilateral intervention for purposes under self-defense, introduction of
United Nations peacekeeping forces in the territory in question, and
intervention to counteract violations of human rights."9 These excep-
tions are considered in turn.
A. Armed force as an enforcement measure taken by the United
Nations Security Council under Article 42
The Charter allows use of force to be employed by the Security
Council essentially if prior sanctions have shown ineffective and if
international peace is endangered. 2 '
First, prior sanctions must have been demonstrated to be ineffec-
tive. In the case of Yugoslavia, it appears that the sanctions which
have been issued to date, namely trade and weapons embargoes, have,
indeed, failed. This is due on the one hand to the inability of Serbia's
neighbors to enforce the embargo because of the complete lack of en-
forcement logistics.' 2' On the other hand, the embargoes have seen
little enforcement due to the lack of the Orthodox world's desire to
enforce the embargo because of Greece's fear of Macedonian expansion-
ism'2 2 and due to the dependency of Yugoslavia's neighbors on their
117. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 38-39 (Louis Henkin et. al., eds., 1989).
118. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Oscar Schachter, Authorized Use of Force by the United Nations
and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
65 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 42, which states:
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Id.
121. See GAO Report to Senator Kennedy, supra note 76.
122. Weller, supra note 44, at 588.
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Serbian export market."z These factors have not improved to date;
they in fact help deepen the crisis.'
Second, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina must present a threat
to international peace. It appears that Article 42 does not view vio-
lations of human rights committed within a country to be within its
scope.' However, in a resolution passed at the beginning of the war,
the Security Council did consider the events in ex-Yugoslavia as a
threat to international peace and security when it first implemented
the embargo.' 6
The limitation of the exception to the threat of international peace
is essential because if human rights violations of any kind were
grounds for intervention under Article 42, the principle of state sover-
eignty would be significantly restricted' 7 . It appears that the ab-
sence of such limitation would make the entire exception unworkable
because, for instance, some countries' laws' roots in religion directly
violate some standards of human rights." Critics of that limitation
raise examples such as the intervention against Iraq, in which threats
to international peace and security "are more likely to be acknowl-
edged when the target country is geo-politically significant. Displaced
persons from these countries or oil-rich states may gain attention,
while those from poorer nations languish because their loss is not
perceived as a threat to international peace.""a Given this analysis,
123. See GAO Report to Senator Kennedy, supra note 76.
124. While the Bosnian Serb faction is supplied with arms from its Yugoslav
neighbor, Bosnian Muslims have no access to such arms as they are land locked. In
recent months, the United Nations Assembly expressed a desire to lift the arms
embargo. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Assembly Approves Call for End to Bosnian Arms
Embargo, N. Y. TIMES, November 4, 1994, at A6. Lifting the arms embargo would
do nothing to ease the pain of the Bosnia-Hercegovinan population, but it might at
least in some way level the rules of war, which so far has been a deck of cards
militarily stacked in favor of the Serbs.
125. Jost Delbrack, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Au-
thority of the United Nations, 67 INDIANA L.J. 887, 888 (1992) [hereinafter Fresh
Look].
126. See S.C. Rec. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991).
Some writers contend that no threat of international peace exists since the
fighting remains limited to the borders of former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L. J. 903,
910 (1992). Such articles continue to ignore the fact that Bosnia-Hercegovina has
been recognized as a nation, whereas the new, "rump" Yugoslavia, consisting of Ser-
bia and Montenegro, remains to be admitted to the United Nations. See supra note
65 and accompanying text.
127. Fresh Look, supra note 125, at 890.
128. For example, some Arabic countries inflict crippling corporal punishment for
certain crimes committed by their subjects.
129. Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Human-
itarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty? 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, available
on WESTLAW, Jir database (1993).
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it clearly appears that the Security Council may give orders to any of
its surrogates to militarily intervene in the Yugoslavian war to create
peace, not to merely enforce humanitarian aid.
B. Collective and individual self-defense under Article 51
Article 51, in its ambiguous language, allows both individual and
collective self-defense in cases of armed attack;"s much of the debate
around Article 51 lingers around the definition of aggression. 3' How-
ever, since Bosnia-Hercegovina has been recognized as a state in April
of 1992, it appears that the direct and indirect aid delivered by the
Yugoslav Serbs to the Bosnian Serbs despite the Security Council's
embargo presents an act of aggression under customary international
law as defined by the Definition of Aggression'32 and interpreted by
the International Court of Justice."'
Once it can be acknowledged that an act of aggression has taken
place by the Yugoslav Serbs against the Bosnia-Hercegovinan govern-
ment through its support of the Bosnian Serbs, the road to collective
self defense appears to have been paved. The hesitation of the United
Nations to militarily intervene, then, may be the result not of inability
to do so, but based on the continuing hope for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict. However, in this case, threats of use of force by the United
States" and by the United Nations appear to continue to be a politi-
130. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, which reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Id.
131. See generally Eugene V. Rostow, Armed Force, Peaceful Settlement, and the
United Nations Charter: Are there Alternatives to "A New International Anarchy"? 77
AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 31 (1983).
132. See Definition of Aggression (1974), G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1974); Article 3 states:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shaH, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such grav-
ity as to amount to [an attack as defined in omitted paragraphs], or its substantial
involvement therein. Id.
133. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27). In this case, the
Unites States militarily supported rebel forces in that country against the de jure
government.
134. Juliet O'Neil and Julian Beltrame, Europe, U.S. Back Use of Air Strikes to
End Siege, THE OTrAwA CrrlzEN, Feb. 8, 1994, at A6.
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cal means to achieve a settlement without United Nations military
intervention, a plan of action which has shown largely unsuccessful so
far. 
135
One arguable limitation to self-defense is the customary interna-
tional law concept of proportionality, which requires that the actions of
the defending state may not exceed those of the attacker. 31 Most re-
ports indicate that while the Serb attackers continue to revert to geno-
cide as a medium of war, the Bosnian Muslims generally, but by no
means always, remain within the realms of international laws of war-
fare. Although proportionality is otherwise a difficult concept to apply
in belligerent situations, 7 the balance dictated by the proportionali-
ty principle appears to have been in favor of the Muslim side, a result
favoring collective intervention on behalf of the United Nations.
C. United Nations peacekeeping forces authorized by the Security
Council or General Assembly and employed in agreement with the
states concerned
The role and size of United Nations peacekeeping forces in
Bosnia-Hercegovina has increased extensively in recent years in the
area of refugee management, humanitarian aid, and election monitor-
ing."'38 Bosnia's President, after Bosnia was recognized as a state, re-
quested such peacekeeping forces, and, after initial hesitation, they
were properly employed.'39
The question is whether the United Nations troops have been, or
ever will be successful. Countless violations of cease-fires followed by
equally fruitless attempts to prevent the fighting between the factions
demonstrate that the peacekeeping forces have failed in their objective
to "help create the conditions of peace and security required for negoti-
ation of an overall political settlement among the contending par-
ties." "' This is not due to their lack of competency, but rather to the
strict limitations the Security Council has placed on their activities. To
date, they have not been successful in the peacemaking process, but
have been marginally successful in assuring that aid is delivered to the
needy refugees. Many more troops are likely to be needed if their goal
is to enforce peace agreements militarily, a reality which is partially
due to the fact that the infrastructure of the territory in Bosnia-
135. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
136. See Schachter, supra note 105, at 1637.
137. See Kahn, supra note 112, at 435.
138. Bartram S. Brown, International Law: The Protection of Human Rights in
Disintegrating States: A New Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 203, 218 (1992).
139. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140. Brown, supra note 138, at 219.
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Hercegovina can only with difficulty support ground troops and artil-
lery.
141
One writer lists the following factors to help determine whether
peacekeeping efforts will be successful; these are a strong international
consensus, a workable mandate, and a force with an effective integrat-
ed command.4 4 Although the current mandate is less than workable,
the international consensus is not yet as present as one may wish.
Integration of command does not appear to pose a problem as such
integration has not posed significant problems in prior instances, such
as during the war against Iraq, in which a resolution to the conflict
was relatively quickly achieved. The instant problem faced by the
United Nations forces is their lack of authority to take more aggressive
military measures; this causes the troops either to keep potential refu-
gees in their home villages where their lives are in danger or to move
them to safer areas, which would essentially aid the ethnic cleansing
process."3 Authorized use of more aggressive force by the Security
Council would not only eliminate the latter concern, but would also
allow for more aggressive protection of the villagers.
D. Collateral intervention as a measure responding to violations of
human rights'"
The violations are well-known, and their results are document-
ed."5 There have been "numerous reports of 'ethnic cleansing', in-
cluding civilian killings, mutilation, torture, starvation, operation of
detention centers, executions, mass graves, systematic rape, and mass
terrorization of Croats and Muslims."" These acts are illegal under
141. See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 11, at 236.
142. Nikolai B. Krylov, International Peacekeeping and Enforcement After the Cold
War, in LAw AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 97 (Lri Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., 1991).
143. Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protection,
26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 495, 500 (1993).
144. Louis Henkin et. al., 2 RIGHT V. MIGHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 50 (1991). For a full discussion of human rights and their relation to
international law, see Myres S. McDougal et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OP AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
145. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
146. Webb, supra note 2, at 380.
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the Genocide Convention of 1948," 7 and constitute violations of the
most basic human rights.
In certain circumstances, violation of Article 2(4) is justified if
human rights are at stake. '" Instances of intervention to prevent
violations of human rights are plentiful;149 the difficulty lies in strik-
ing a balance between Article 2(7) of the Charter and the need to pro-
tect individuals from the atrocities committed by its own government
or a third party." In Bosnia-Hercegovina, numerous violations of
human rights have taken place on both sides,'51 and the Internation-
al Court of Justice has issued the appropriate opinion."2 It would ap-
pear that even Articles 1(3) and 55(c)" taken alone would outweigh
147. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Article II states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole, or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
a)Killing members of the group;
b)Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d)Imposing measures intended to prevent bilrths within the group;
e)Forcibly transferring children of the group to another grbup. Id.
For an excellent analysis of the Genocide Treaty, see Matthew Lippman, The 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five
Years Later, 8 TEMP. INVL & COMP. L. J. 1 (1994).
148. See Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-help by States to Protect Human
Rights: Recent Views from United Nations, Humanitarian Intervention and the United
Nations 201 app. (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 1973). This premise is heavily contradicted
by others because, among other reasons, there is no "black letter rule" permitting it.
See Roger S. Clark, Humanitarian Intervention: Help to your Friends and State Prac-
tice, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 211 (1983). These positions have been essentially
eliminated by recent decisions of the Security Council in its request of NATO to en-
force humanitarian aid mandates.
149. For pre-Bosnia analyses of the validity of humanitarian intervention, see
Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note
105, at 1629 (discussing the validity of India's intervention in East Pakistan to pro-
tect Bengalis during Pakistan's 1971 civil war); see also Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217-228 (John Norton
Moore, ed., 1974).
150. See Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and
Haiti - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law - Part 1, 20 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992).
151. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 121.
152. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hercegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), reprinted in 87 A.J.I.L. 505 (1993).
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, which states:
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an econom-
ic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion; .... Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
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the issue of sovereignty with respect to Yugoslavia, as any actions
contrary to Article 1(3) by any state would undermine the very purpose
of the United Nations and would violate article 2(4) itself."s
One writer offers five criteria under which humanitarian military
intervention should be permitted.'55 These criteria include the se-
verity of human rights violations, the nature of the intervention, the
purpose of the intervention, the extent and collectivity of the action,
and the balance of alternatives and outcomes." To briefly apply
these criteria, not many crimes are more severe than those of genocide.
Intervention would last as long as necessary, at the minimum, to stop
the violence, at the maximum, to forcibly return Yugoslav forces to
their own borders after a lasting peace accord has been agreed upon
and has been implemented by the factions. The purpose of such inter-
vention would clearly be in furtherance of a humanitarian concern;
under the United Nations umbrella, such action would be of collective
instead of unilateral nature. Although the question of balancing alter-
natives and outcomes is a difficult one to resolve until the conflict is
essentially over and one has the advantage of hindsight, it appears
apparent that, at this late date, any positive intervention will begin to
help save lives and will ease the exodus refugee burden on Bosnia-
Hercegovina and the influx refugee burden on neighboring coun-
tries."'57 At the minimum, the past three years of impotence on behalf
of the United Nations would finally come to a close, and, at the maxi-
mum, such intervention would serve as an important precedent to
future conflicts and as a deterrent to future violators of human rights.
The human rights violations in Bosnia-Hercegovina to date alone must
more than justify intervention by any state or by the United Nations
with the objective to restore a normal life in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
This article focused on the United Nations' possibilities for mili-
tary intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to achieve peace.
Based upon the above discussion of the four different standards under
which the United Nations may intervene in the Yugoslav war, it ap-
Art. 55, para. c states:
[The United Nations shall promote] universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion. Id.
154. Jordan J. Praust, Conflicting Norms of Intervention: More Variables For the
'Equation, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 305, 306 (1983). See Fernando R. Tres6n,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 130-137 (1988)
for a full discussion of this conflict.
155. Nanda, supra note 150, at 330.
156. Id.
157. Steinberg, supra note 12, at 50. The latter has been a hot issue for debate
in Croatia, Slovenia, and many Western European nations.
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pears that the United Nations, if it so desires, has the legal authority
to do so. Why, then, does the United Nations not follow its own exam-
ple set during the Iraq conflict and achieve peace in this manner?
Why, instead, does the United Nations continue to negotiate with the
Serb factions, who have shown on many occasions that their interest is
not in peace but in expansionism utilizing tools of genocide and ethnic
cleansing?
The answer can only be found, unfortunately, in politics itself."'
The United States, often the first to loudly condemn such incidents,
does not have, so it appears, any economic or national interests in
Bosnia, and is, therefore, reluctant to proceed with military interven-
tion, "'59 or to use its powerful role to persuade the United Nations to
militarily solve the crisis."'° Some even say that the United States
Department of State deliberately downplays Bosnian genocide accounts
in order to avoid public opinion outbursts for United States action.'
European nations, on the other hand, view Bosnia-Hercegovina as
a hot iron not to be touched,"2 remembering the sore experience of
World War I after the events in Sarajevo. In addition, Europeans do
not particularly like the idea of another neighboring Muslim state;"
as a result, the European Union excuses its inaction by claiming that
its hands are tied without clear United Nations authority to act.'
In addition to regional excuses for inaction, it appears that the
United Nations and the Security Council do not wish to engage in
conduct which is unpopular with Western governments." 5 As one
158. See, e.g., United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable
Robert S. Dole, U.S. Senate, Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of Operations in
Bosnia 4 (April 1994) (summarizing the evaluation of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees about this GAO report) [hereinafter GAO Report to Senator
Dole].
159. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
160. Prior examples of the United States' using this influence are plentiful; one
needs to point merely to the Iraq and Somalia conflicts. See, e.g., Samuel M.
Makinda, SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 59-
82 (1993).
161. Aide says U.S. Ignores Genocide, N. Y. TIMES, February 4, 1994, at 4 (citing
Richard Johnson, former head of U.S. Department of State's Yugoslavia desk).
162. See Sciolino, supra note 87.
163. See Balkan Moral Order, supra note 4. "Britain and France, concerned about
the emergence of a Muslim state in Europe, are now eager to forget the brutality of
the Serbs." Id.
164. See Brian Hall, Blue Helmets, Empty Guns, N. Y. TIMES, January 2, 1994, at
20. This proposition appears to hold, at least on its face, true, since the 1958 Treaty
of Rome does not address the deployment of military forces into non-member na-
tions.
165. The tragedy caused by this inaction is amplified by the fact that, according
to some, the Security Council is finally working as intended by the drafters of the
Charter. Prior to the end of the Cold War, any one of the five permanent members
of the Council would frequently use its veto power to avoid Council action. Recently,
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commentator has phrased the problem: "None of this should come as a
great surprise because we are speaking about concerns based on hu-
man rights, not the rights of governments, and the United Nations is
an organizaticn of governments, not human beings."" In fairness it
must be acknowledged that the United Nations helped relieve the
suffering in Bosnia-Hercegovina to some extent. Through the help of
the United Nations, less numbers starved, the Sarajevo airport was
kept operational throughout much of this crisis, and airlifts and con-
voys reduced the overall suffering through their providing of medical
and other assistance.1
67
However, the United Nations did not stop human rights abuses
and the killing of civilians."~ While Bosnian leaders long ago invited
a strong United Nations presence, 69 the United Nations still appears
to follow the wishes of Western nations. 7 This policy has the effect
of rendering the United Nations an instrument of the United States
Department of State. Ironically, this is the precise effect which the
United Nations has tried hard to avoid in the past,' as such an ef-
fect would undermine the quintessential existence of any transnational
body.
However, imagine that Serbia successfully realizes its goal of a
"Greater Serbia." Such a vision, if achieved, may be sustainable
1 72
the Security Council members have overcome this stalemate and cooperate with each
other. See, e.g., The Stanley Foundation, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY: CAN
THE UNITED NATIONS KEEP PACE 25-26 (1992).
166. Douglass Cassel, Jr., Tenth Annual International Law Symposium 1993 -
Select Panel Discussions: Bosnia, War Crimes, and Humanitarian Intervention, 15
WHITTIER L. REV. 445 (1994).
167. GAO Report to Senator Dole, supra note 158, at 25.
168. See id.
169. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick and Morton I. Abramowitz, Lift the Embargo, N. Y.
TIMES, April 20, 1994, at A19. Obviously, notwithstanding international law issues,
one of the factors which contributes to successful peacekeeping operations is the
desire by the affected population to have a U.N. presence. See, e.g. Barbara
Crossette, U.N. Falters in Post-Cold-War Peacekeeping, but Sees Role as Essential, N.
Y. TIMES, December 5, 1994, at A6 [hereinafter U.N. Falters).
170. The reason for this lies in the fact that the United Nations and the Security
Council are political bodies, considering media coverage, public opinion, and budget-
ary issues first; the rule of law appears to be a secondary consideration. See, e.g.,
The Stanley Foundation, THE U.N. ROLE IN INTERVENTION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM
HERE? 20-21 (1993).
171. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Leader to Call for Changes in Peacekeeping, N. Y.
TIMES, January 3, 1995, at A3 (in an interview with Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary General to the United Nations) [hereinafter U.N. Leader to Call for
Changes].
172. Sabrina Petra Ramet, BALKAN BABEL: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND RELIGION IN
YUGOSLAVIA 180 (1992) (quoting Milos Vasic, editor of VREME, a Belgrade opposition
paper). A "Greater Serbia" is not achievable through peaceful means due to the
cultural, religious, and political diversity. Of course, if the Serbs succeed in their
ethnic cleansing campaign, minority opposition of the Serb intellectual community
will be small.
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but would also lead to a less secure Europe. The new Yugoslavia, led
by Serbia and Montenegro, is presently in charge of the armaments of
what was once the fifth largest army in the world. To allow the exis-
tence of a "Greater Serbia" as the successor to the new Yugoslavia
could eventually lead to insecurity not only in Central Europe, but in
Western Europe as well. Until the United States policy makers under-
stand this danger, the United States will not originate a sincere push
for peace.
Tragically, without a firm push by both the European Union and
the United States, military intervention under the supervision of the
United Nations in order to achieve peace is not likely to take place.
Past accounts of this cruel war'73 as of yet have not moved global
powers to intervene.
Two recommendations follow from these conclusions. First, the
United Nations must learn to cope with its new role in the post-Cold
War era. If United Nations members must pass amendments to the
Charter in order to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the
Securities Council,' so be it. If the establishment of a quick re-
sponse securities force is required to quickly quell regional dis-
putes, 75 so be it. Hardly any measure, if achieved through democrat-
ic process by legal means, is too authoritarian or coercive if the objec-
tive is the keeping of world peace and the prevention of gross human
rights violations. This is because one of the United Nation's main goals
is the maintenance of international security, a goal which the United
Nations has not been able to achieve in the Bosnian crisis and a goal
which the United Nations will never achieve, unless it is willing to
implement drastic measures to calm the conflict under discussion and
to prevent future wars. 71 In the long term, the costs of achieving and
maintaining peace will be outweighed by their benefits, as only then
will the United Nations have the time to devote itself to other impor-
tant human issues, such as the environment, underdevelopment, and
overpopulation.
77
Second, the West must follow its own tough words, condemna-
tions, and threats with actions. 78 Such actions would save lives and
accomplish peace. The West promised the Bosnians peace at the begin-
ning of the war; delivery of this promise is long overdue.
173. See, e.g., Zlatko Dizdarevic, SARAJEVO: A WAR JOURNAL (1993); Slavenka
Drakulic, THE BALKAN ExPREss: FRAGMENTS FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF WAR (1993).
174. Ferencz supra note 91.
175. U.N. Falters, supra note 169.
176. See Ferencz, supra note 91.
177. U.N. Leader to Call for Changes, supra note 171.
178. Robert Marquand and Faye Bowers, Slovenian Premier Urges West: Stay
Tough on Serbs, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 1994, 6 (quoting Janez Drnovsek,
Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia).
VOL. 24:2,3
1996 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 487
[Editors' Note: The state of affairs for the purposes of this article is
February 1995. During the late summer of 1995, NATO selectively
bombed Bosnian Serb targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Bosnian
Serbs continued to violate established "safe areas" and after yet another
shelling in the center of Sarajevo taking many innocent lives. In addi-
tion, the 1995 Dayton Agreement permitted U.N. peacekeeping forces to
carry out various objectives within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These recent events do not alter the analysis as presented in this article.
The United Nations, here with the help of NATO, and international
leadership will only consider military intervention, whether legal or
illegal under international law, if the political climate supports such
action. It is respectfully submitted that only the consistent application
and enforcement of international law, not swings of political winds or
smooth-speaking Western "expert" negotiators, will ensure a peaceful
world order.]

